Fundamentals
Re-Testing the Spin-Off Company Premium
Demerged companies are supposed to beat the market because their first new owners dump them indiscriminately. I checked that rule of thumb against the past decade's batch of spin-offs.
In his May 29, 1969 investor letter, Warren Buffett quoted a now-unknown observer, who said of security analysts over forty: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”1 Buffett was 38 when he wrote that letter. I’ve recently turned 40, and Buffett’s point is a good reminder to check up on past rules of thumb and see which still test out today.
One of the better-known heuristics in special-situation investing comes from Joel Greenblatt’s 1997 book You Can Be a Stock Market Genius: pay attention to spin-offs. When a company hands one of its divisions to its own shareholders as a separately traded stock, Greenblatt argued, the new shares tend to beat the market, and for underlying reasons that are built into the process itself.
The book is nearly thirty years old, and the evidence behind it is older still. So I went back to the spin-off chapter, noted the reasons he gave, and tested each one against the corporate demergers of the past ten years.
In a nutshell, some spin-offs in the period I studied were remarkably successful, but mostly not discoverable on the criteria that Greenblatt wrote about in 1997. An investor who applied his method in the past ten years might have struggled. Let’s walk through the evidence and see what has aged well, and what hasn’t.
What Greenblatt Argued
Greenblatt’s starting point is a Penn State study covering the 25 years ending in 1988. It found that spin-off stocks beat both their industry peers and the S&P 500 by about 10 percentage points a year over their first three years, and that the biggest gains arrived in the second year, not the first.2
He then gives three reasons why this happens:
- The shares go to the wrong owners. Spun-off equity isn’t sold to people who want it. It’s handed to the parent’s shareholders, who may own that position for unrelated reasons. Many of them will sell the spin-off right away; institutions often have to, because the new company is too small for their portfolio or sits outside the index they track. The result is selling that has nothing to do with what the business is worth, leading to undervaluation.
- Management is set free. Once a division runs on its own, its managers are accountable for their own results and can be paid in their own stock, which better aligns their incentives with the new shareholders.
- A spin-off signals a board that cares about shareholders. Companies that choose to break themselves up are, on average, the ones paying attention to shareholder value, so the management of spin-offs is, on average, going to be better.
To be fair to the book, Greenblatt doesn’t recommend buying every spin-off. He tells the reader to pick spots, and he names what he looks for: institutions selling for reasons unrelated to the investment merits; insiders buying in; and the spin-off should uncover an opportunity that was hidden previously inside the parent, which in several of his examples is heavy leverage. He treats existing debt as an advantage, because improvement in the business will be magnified for the equity-holders.
That gave me four questions to test:
- Would a strategy of buying every spin-off beat the market?
- Is there actually a dumping period early on after the spin happens, and can an investor time it?
- Does higher leverage in the new company actually help?
- Do high insider stakes mark the winners?
And, supposing the group as a whole doesn’t outperform, do individual outperformers have anything in common that could have been spotted at the time?
Ten Years of Corporate Hand-Me-Downs
Working with Claude and drawing from public sources, I put together a list of 245 corporate separations completed between January 2016 and October 2026. There is no centralized reporting for spin-offs, so it’s possible some were missed.
Corporate transactions vary and not all of them are what Greenblatt had in mind. I kept the “plain” spin-offs: a US-based parent distributing shares of a division pro rata to its own shareholders, with the new company listed on a US exchange. That left 160. I set aside the spin-mergers, the exchange offers (where shareholders choose whether to swap), the spin-offs that followed an IPO, and the ones with foreign parents, although some of those come back later as a cross-check.
It’s also worth seeing what became of the earlier spin-offs, because it affects everything that follows. Of the 160, 93 were spun off between 2016 and 2021, which gives each of them at least four years of history to look back on:
| Status as of November 2026 | Spin-offs | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Still trading | 59 | 63% |
| Acquired or merged | 21 | 23% |
| Went through bankruptcy (two reorganized and still trade) | 8 | 9% |
| Liquidated or liquidating | 3 | 3% |
| Other (moved off exchange, or unknown) | 2 | 2% |
Source: exchange listing and delisting records, company announcements; tabulation mine.
Roughly a third of them no longer trade as independent companies, which makes collecting data on their returns more difficult.
For each spin-off I took the closing price on its first regular trading day and measured its return over the next week, month, quarter, half-year and year (5, 21, 63, 126 and 252 trading days). I then compared that with the return of the Russell 3000 index over the same days. Wherever this article says “vs. index”, it means the spin-off’s return relative to the Russell 3000.
For the return tests I used a slightly different cut of the 160. I kept the 124 that began trading between November 2016 and November 2025, so that each has a full year of prices behind it, and set aside 32 micro-caps (31 with usable prices), which I look at separately below. Five more had no usable price data a year out, which leaves a main group of 87.
The Ones That Disappeared
My first pass at this used a free source, which had data for 71 of the 87 companies, nearly all of them still trading. On that group the median spin-off beat the index by about 6% over twelve months, and 58% came out ahead. That would read as a modest but real edge.
Then I tracked down prices for the delisted companies from a second data vendor. Here is the first year for spin-offs in the sample that were later acquired, went bankrupt, were delisted or liquidated:
| Spin-off | Year | What happened later | First 12 months vs. index |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loyalty Ventures | 2021 | Bankrupt | -96% |
| Vimeo | 2021 | Acquired | -80% |
| ZimVie | 2022 | Acquired | -75% |
| Veoneer | 2018 | Acquired | -64% |
| CorePoint Lodging | 2018 | Acquired | -57% |
| Equitrans Midstream | 2018 | Acquired | -55% |
| Enhabit | 2022 | Acquired | -54% |
| Garrett Motion | 2018 | Bankrupt, reorganized | -48% |
| 2seventy bio | 2021 | Acquired | -43% |
| Maxeon Solar Technologies | 2020 | Delisted | -33% |
| WK Kellogg Co | 2023 | Acquired | -4% |
| IAA | 2019 | Acquired | -4% |
| The Aaron’s Company | 2020 | Acquired | -2% |
| Retail Value Inc | 2018 | Liquidated | +1% |
| Aimco | 2020 | Liquidating | +22% |
| Arcosa | 2018 | Acquired | +28% |
| Arconic Corp | 2020 | Acquired | +121% |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data, exchange delisting records; calculations mine.
The median for these 17 was 43% behind the index, and only 4 of them were ahead after a year. Being acquired sounds like a happy ending, but for most of these companies the buyer arrived after the stock had already fallen a long way.
The point: a study that only includes spin-offs still trading today is looking at the survivors, and the survivors were naturally the better batch. Adding the others back took the result from “small edge” to nothing.
Did Buying Every Spin-Off Work?
No, not in this sample. Here is the hypothetical return of the 87 spin-offs against the index, measured from the first day’s close:
| Time since first trading day | Median vs. index | 90% confidence interval | Average vs. index | Share beating the index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| One week | -1.5% | -3.0% to +0.4% | -0.7% | 44% |
| One month | -1.3% | -5.7% to +3.6% | -0.4% | 48% |
| Three months | -0.4% | -6.5% to +3.4% | +0.4% | 47% |
| Six months | -4.1% | -8.8% to +7.1% | +2.8% | 44% |
| Twelve months | +0.6% | -9.5% to +6.3% | +15.9% | 51% |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data; index is the Russell 3000 as tracked by the iShares ETF (IWV); calculations mine. Hypothetical backtest, before trading costs and taxes.
The 12-month average return looks excellent +15.9%, but that figure is mosttly driven by three companies. Sandisk finished its first year roughly 1,010% ahead of the index, followed by Cerence and Biohaven. Take those three out, and the average for the other 84 is +0.5%.
I treat Sandisk as a wild outlier. When Western Digital spun it off in early 2025, the surge in demand for AI components that drove the stock wasn’t foreseeable, and six months in it was still 11 points behind the index. Arguably, it’s not a replicable result for a spin-off driven investment process.
Is There a Dumping Period?
Spin-offs supposedly generate excess returns because the shares start off undervalued. That mechanic is easily testable. If the parent’s shareholders dump the new stock without regard to price then we should see heavy selling at the start, a depressed price, followed by a recovery once the selling is done.
The heavy trading is observable in my sample. For the 71 companies with daily data, I compared each day’s volume with the stock’s own normal level later in its first year:
| Trading day | Volume, as a multiple of normal |
|---|---|
| Day 1 | 9.5x |
| Day 2 | 5.5x |
| Day 5 | 4.3x |
| Day 10 | 1.9x |
| Day 21 | 1.5x |
| Day 63 | 1.0x |
Source: Yahoo Finance volume data; ’normal’ is each stock’s median daily volume in months 7 through 12; calculations mine.
So the shares do change hands in a hurry. Most of the turnover is finished within two weeks, and by the end of the first quarter volume is back to normal.
What I can’t find is the price pattern that’s supposed to go with it. The median spin-off slipped 1.5% against the index in its first week, which is small and not statistically different from zero, and there was no rebound afterward.
Could an investor do better by waiting for the selling to finish? I checked what happened to a buyer who waited a week, a month, a quarter or six months, and then held to the one-year mark. The median results against the index were +0.2%, -4.4%, -0.4% and -1.3%, compared with +0.6% for buying on day one. None of those is measurably different from the others.
The next question was whether the hardest-hit spin-offs bounced back. I sorted the 87 by their first month. The third that fell the most (a median of 17% behind the index) went on to lose another 10.9% against the index over the rest of the year, though with a wide interval of -35% to +19%. Across the whole sample, the first month and the rest of the year were weakly positively related. If anything, early losers kept losing.
Takeaway: the “wrong owners” do sell, quickly and in volume. But the selling didn’t leave a bargain behind, and there were no clearly good windows to buy.
Does the Second Year Deliver?
In the Penn State study the largest gains came in the second year, which Greenblatt reads as good news: there’s plenty of time to do the research on a spin-off before deciding whether to invest.
I could follow 64 of the spin-offs for a full two years. All of them are companies that still trade, so if anything this group should flatter the result. But that didn’t show up in the data.
| Period | Median vs. index | 90% interval |
|---|---|---|
| First year | +2.5% | -7.9% to +14.6% |
| Second year | -10.2% | -20.4% to +3.9% |
| Both years together | -6.5% | -14.4% to +5.4% |
Source: Yahoo Finance price data; calculations mine. Hypothetical backtest, before trading costs and taxes.
The second year was worse than the first, not better. The statistical confidence interval is wide enough that I wouldn’t claim spin-offs reliably lag in year two, but there’s also no sign of a delayed payoff.
Good Vintages and Bad
Sorting the sample of 87 by the year they were spun off shows how uneven the decade was:
| Year of spin | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | Beat the index | Largest spin-offs that year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 8 | -4.5% | 3 of 8 | Conduent, Brighthouse Financial, Park Hotels & Resorts, Hilton Grand Vacations |
| 2018 | 10 | -30.7% | 4 of 10 | Resideo Technologies, Garrett Motion, Veoneer, nVent Electric |
| 2019 | 7 | -3.9% | 3 of 7 | Dow Inc, Corteva, Fox Corp, Kontoor Brands |
| 2020 | 10 | +9.7% | 5 of 10 | Carrier Global, Otis Worldwide, Arconic Corp, IAC |
| 2021 | 14 | -34.2% | 3 of 14 | Kyndryl, Organon, GXO Logistics, Victoria’s Secret |
| 2022 | 11 | +19.5% | 7 of 11 | Constellation Energy, RXO, F&G Annuities & Life, MasterBrand |
| 2023 | 13 | +3.1% | 8 of 13 | GE HealthCare, Veralto, NCR Atleos, Worthington Steel |
| 2024 | 6 | +25.6% | 4 of 6 | GE Vernova, Solventum, Everus Construction Group, Curbline Properties |
| 2025 | 7 | +11.0% | 6 of 7 | Sandisk, Qnity Electronics, Solstice Advanced Materials, Lionsgate Studios |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data; calculations mine. ‘Largest’ is by revenue in the year before the spin. One late-2016 spin-off is omitted.
The 2018 and 2021 classes did badly, with medians about 31% and 34% behind the index. Those two years account for 13 of the 25 worst performers in the whole sample. The classes from 2022 onward did well. With only six to fourteen companies a year I wouldn’t read much into any single row, but the spread tells me that when a company was spun off did matter a great deal.
Smaller Was Not Better
Greenblatt’s mechanism suggests the smallest spin-offs should be the best ones. They’re the most likely to be too small for institutions to hold, and so the most likely to be sold for non-investment reasons, allowing later owners to get a bargain.
The 31 micro-cap spin-offs I’d set aside tell a different story. Their median was 42.9% behind the index after a year (interval -70% to -19%), and only 23% of them beat it. This group includes a string of small shipping and biotech carve-outs, and it’s the worst-performing corner of the whole study.
The 20 spin-offs that followed an IPO, or were done as exchange offers, also lagged, with a median 19.1% behind the index.
Picking Targets: What Factors Did the Outperformers Share?
Taken as a group, then, spin-offs didn’t outperform over the past decade. But that isn’t quite the claim Greenblatt made, since he was explicit about choosing carefully among them. So the more useful question is whether anything that could be known at the time of the spin-off separated the best from the worst.
To get at that, I split the 87 into three groups by their first-year result. Twenty-six finished more than 25 points ahead of the index, which I’ll call the overperformers. Twenty-five finished more than 25 points behind, the underperformers. The other 36 landed in between.
| Spin-off | Parent | Year | Sector | 12-month return vs. index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sandisk | Western Digital | 2025 | Technology | +1010% |
| Cerence | Nuance Communications | 2019 | Technology | +172% |
| Biohaven Ltd | Biohaven Pharmaceutical (sold to Pfizer) | 2022 | Healthcare | +159% |
| GRAIL | Illumina | 2024 | Healthcare | +149% |
| Arconic Corp | Arconic Inc (now Howmet) | 2020 | Industrials | +121% |
| Pennant Group | Ensign Group | 2019 | Healthcare | +120% |
| GE Vernova | General Electric (now GE Aerospace) | 2024 | Industrials | +104% |
| F&G Annuities & Life | Fidelity National Financial | 2022 | Financials | +101% |
| Constellation Energy | Exelon | 2022 | Utilities | +85% |
| MasterBrand | Fortune Brands Home & Security (now Fortune Brands Innovations) | 2022 | Consumer Discretionary | +56% |
| Worthington Steel | Worthington Industries (renamed Worthington Enterprises) | 2023 | Materials | +53% |
| IAC | IAC/InterActiveCorp (old; became Match Group) | 2020 | Communication Services | +50% |
| Everus Construction Group | MDU Resources | 2024 | Industrials | +49% |
| Carrier Global | United Technologies (now RTX) | 2020 | Industrials | +47% |
| Knife River | MDU Resources | 2023 | Materials | +47% |
| DT Midstream | DTE Energy | 2021 | Energy | +44% |
| CONSOL Energy | CNX Resources (was CONSOL Energy) | 2017 | Energy | +41% |
| Crane Company | Crane Holdings (renamed Crane NXT) | 2023 | Industrials | +37% |
| ESAB | Colfax (now Enovis) | 2022 | Industrials | +37% |
| Hilton Grand Vacations | Hilton Worldwide | 2017 | Consumer Discretionary | +34% |
| Net Lease Office Properties | W. P. Carey | 2023 | Real Estate | +31% |
| Vitesse Energy | Jefferies Financial Group | 2023 | Energy | +29% |
| Sylvamo | International Paper | 2021 | Materials | +29% |
| Arcosa | Trinity Industries | 2018 | Industrials | +28% |
| Concentrix | SYNNEX (now TD Synnex) | 2020 | Technology | +28% |
| Varex Imaging | Varian Medical Systems | 2017 | Healthcare | +26% |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data; calculations mine. Returns are for the first twelve months after each spin-off only, relative to the Russell 3000, and say nothing about how these companies have done since.
| Spin-off | Parent | Year | Sector | 12-month return vs. index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loyalty Ventures | Alliance Data Systems (now Bread Financial) | 2021 | Industrials | -96% |
| Vimeo | IAC | 2021 | Technology | -80% |
| ZimVie | Zimmer Biomet | 2022 | Healthcare | -75% |
| Resideo Technologies | Honeywell | 2018 | Industrials | -69% |
| Cognyte Software | Verint Systems | 2021 | Technology | -68% |
| Veoneer | Autoliv | 2018 | Consumer Discretionary | -64% |
| Kyndryl | IBM | 2021 | Technology | -61% |
| Kontoor Brands | V.F. Corp | 2019 | Consumer Discretionary | -58% |
| CorePoint Lodging | La Quinta Holdings | 2018 | Real Estate | -57% |
| Douglas Elliman | Vector Group | 2021 | Real Estate | -57% |
| Equitrans Midstream | EQT | 2018 | Energy | -55% |
| Enhabit | Encompass Health | 2022 | Healthcare | -54% |
| Fortrea | Labcorp | 2023 | Healthcare | -49% |
| Garrett Motion | Honeywell | 2018 | Consumer Discretionary | -48% |
| Xperi Inc | Xperi Holding (renamed Adeia) | 2022 | Technology | -46% |
| 2seventy bio | bluebird bio | 2021 | Healthcare | -43% |
| Dow Inc | DowDuPont | 2019 | Materials | -40% |
| Orion Office REIT | Realty Income | 2021 | Real Estate | -40% |
| GCI Liberty | Liberty Broadband | 2025 | Communication Services | -40% |
| Brighthouse Financial | MetLife | 2017 | Financials | -40% |
| Vestis | Aramark | 2023 | Industrials | -34% |
| Fox Corp | Twenty-First Century Fox | 2019 | Communication Services | -33% |
| Maxeon Solar Technologies | SunPower | 2020 | Technology | -33% |
| Victoria’s Secret | L Brands (now Bath & Body Works) | 2021 | Consumer Discretionary | -28% |
| Inhibrx Biosciences | Inhibrx (sold to Sanofi) | 2024 | Healthcare | -26% |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data; calculations mine. Returns are for the first twelve months after each spin-off only, relative to the Russell 3000, and say nothing about how these companies have done since.
Is It Just the Sector?
The first thing that stands out in the two lists is the sector column. Industrial, energy, materials and utility companies show up much more often among the outperformers.
| Sector group | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | 90% interval | Over | Under | Largest examples |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrials, energy, materials, utilities | 29 | +19.5% | +6% to +37% | 14 | 5 | Dow Inc, GE Vernova, Constellation Energy, Carrier Global |
| All other sectors | 58 | -7.8% | -14% to +1% | 12 | 20 | Kyndryl, GE HealthCare, Fox Corp, Solventum |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price data; sector classifications mine; calculations mine.
The hard-asset spin-offs beat the index by a median of 19.5%, and this is one of the few cuts where the interval stays clear of zero. But most of it comes from recent years. For spin-offs from 2016 through 2020 the hard-asset median was +3.8%; for 2021 through 2025 it was +29.4%. To me that looks driven by the industrial and power cycle uptick of the past few years, moreso than a durable feature of spin-offs.
Does Leverage Help?
This is Greenblatt’s “hidden opportunity.” To test it using only what an investor could have seen on the day of the spin-off, I compared each company’s net debt on its first balance sheet as an independent company with its EBITDA in the last full year before the spin.3
| Net debt at spin vs. prior-year EBITDA | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | 90% interval | Over | Under | Largest examples |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash | 16 | -17.7% | -45% to +20% | 5 | 8 | GE Vernova, Corteva, IAC, Veoneer |
| Debt under 2x EBITDA | 25 | +11.2% | -11% to +29% | 11 | 5 | Dow Inc, Constellation Energy, Fox Corp, Arconic Corp |
| Debt 2x to 4x EBITDA | 24 | -1.6% | -10% to +7% | 5 | 5 | Carrier Global, GE HealthCare, Otis Worldwide, Solventum |
| Debt over 4x EBITDA, or debt with no EBITDA | 22 | -1.4% | -24% to +11% | 5 | 7 | Kyndryl, Sandisk, Conduent, NCR Atleos |
Source: Wisesheets fundamentals, company filings; calculations mine.
There’s no sign here that leverage helped. The most indebted group was roughly even with the index, and the best results came from companies with modest debt.
Among the 57 non-financial companies that carried debt, more leverage went with somewhat lower returns (a rank correlation of -0.31, interval -0.51 to -0.09). The companies with net cash were a mixed bag, since that group holds both established businesses and younger, cash-funded companies with no earnings.
Were They Making Money?
The plainest question turned out to be the most useful one. Was the business profitable, on its own accounts, in the last full year before it was spun off?
| Group | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | 90% interval | Over | Under | Largest examples |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitable in the year before the spin | 56 | +6.5% | -3% to +21% | 21 | 10 | Dow Inc, Carrier Global, GE HealthCare, Otis Worldwide |
| Loss-making in the year before the spin | 31 | -15.2% | -40% to -0.2% | 5 | 15 | GE Vernova, Constellation Energy, Kyndryl, Corteva |
Source: Wisesheets fundamentals, company filings; calculations mine.
Spin-offs that were profitable beforehand had a median 6.5% ahead of the index, with twice as many overperformers as underperformers. The ones that were losing money had a median 15.2% behind, with three times as many underperformers as outperformers. The gap held in both halves of the decade. Perhaps to no one’s surprise, owning companies that make money isn’t a bad plan!
Five initial loss-making spin-offs did end up among the outperformers: Sandisk, Biohaven, GRAIL, GE Vernova and Constellation Energy. They were the lottery tickets in the sample. For every one of them, three others lost more than 25 points against the index.
| Group | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | 90% interval | Over | Under | Largest examples |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hard-asset sector and profitable | 22 | +28.5% | +6% to +37% | 12 | 3 | Dow Inc, Carrier Global, Otis Worldwide, Arconic Corp |
| Hard-asset sector and loss-making | 7 | +1.8% | -55% to +85% | 2 | 2 | GE Vernova, Constellation Energy, Corteva, GXO Logistics |
| Other sector and profitable | 34 | -0.8% | -10% to +11% | 9 | 7 | GE HealthCare, Fox Corp, Solventum, Organon |
| Other sector and loss-making | 24 | -27.0% | -42% to -2% | 3 | 13 | Kyndryl, Sandisk, Conduent, Victoria’s Secret |
Source: Wisesheets fundamentals, company filings; calculations mine.
Each of the two markers still shows up after accounting for the other. But having now sliced the same 87 companies many different ways, I wanted a check on names that hadn’t been used to find these patterns. There are 63 spin-offs outside the main group with the data I needed: the micro-caps, the foreign-parent spin-offs, the post-IPO spins and the exchange offers.
| Group | Spin-offs | Median vs. index | 90% interval | Over | Under |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitable year pre-spin | 38 | -11.3% | -22% to +1% | 9 | 13 |
| Loss-making year pre-spin | 25 | -56.8% | -80% to -24% | 1 | 16 |
| Industrials, energy, materials, utilities | 16 | -26.7% | -89% to -8% | 1 | 8 |
| All other sectors | 47 | -20.7% | -33% to -6% | 9 | 21 |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price and fundamentals data; calculations mine.
This whole group did poorly, as the earlier sections would lead us to expect. Within it, the profitability gap repeats, and it’s large. The sector advantage doesn’t repeat at all. So I’d put some weight on profitability as a marker, and very little on sector.
Lots of Fundamentals That Didn’t Matter
Several things I expected to be relevant, but were not:
- Valuation. I compared each spin-off’s enterprise value on its first day with its prior-year EBITDA. The cheapest third had a median 6.2% ahead of the index and the most expensive third 3.9% behind, which is the direction you’d hope for, but the intervals overlap almost entirely – not statistically significant.
- Revenue growth before the spin. There was no overall pattern. Splitting by sector was more interesting: outside the hard-asset sectors, the 12 spin-offs with shrinking revenue lagged a median 27% behind the index, while the 9 shrinking hard-asset spin-offs had a median 29% ahead. A falling top line seems to have meant something different in a cyclical business than in the rest, although these are small sample groups we’re working with.
- Profit margins and size. Neither showed any relationship with first-year returns among the 87.
- First-year results. I assumed the underperformers would be the ones whose earnings fell after separation. But spin-offs whose operating income fell in their first year had a median 2.1% ahead of the index, and those where it rose had a median 2.5% behind.
The First Month of Trading Served as a Warning
The early price action did carry some information, though not the kind Greenblatt’s argument implies. Twenty of the 26 outperformers were already ahead of the index after one month. Only 5 of the 25 underperformers were.
Here is what happened from that point to the end of the first year, combined with the profitability marker:
| Group | Spin-offs | Over | Under | Median vs. index, day 21 to month 12 | 90% interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitable, ahead of the index after 21 days | 27 | 16 | 2 | +4.5% | -4% to +27% |
| Profitable, behind after 21 days | 29 | 5 | 8 | -1.6% | -8% to +19% |
| Loss-making, ahead after 21 days | 15 | 4 | 3 | -6.9% | -19% to +14% |
| Loss-making, behind after 21 days | 16 | 1 | 12 | -36.5% | -40% to -17% |
Source: Yahoo Finance and Wisesheets price and fundamentals data; calculations mine. Hypothetical backtest, before trading costs and taxes.
The last row is the most useful one. A spin-off that was losing money beforehand and was behind the index after its first month went on to lose a further 36.5% against the index, and 12 of those 16 ended the year as underperformers. On the other side there’s much less to work with. The profitable spin-offs that started well had already made most of their gain by the time the signal appeared.
So a weak first month worked as a danger sign. Buying the short-term losers doesn’t act as an entry point, which is the opposite of what a “wait for the forced sellers to finish” approach would suggest.
Do Insiders Know?
That leaves the factor Greenblatt weights most heavily. If the people running a spin-off hold a lot of its stock, are the results better?
For all 51 outperformers and underperformers, Claude read the first proxy statement each company filed after its spin-off (or the equivalent filing for foreign companies) and recorded the share of the company owned by its directors and executive officers as a group.
| Measure | Over-performers (26) | Under-performers (25) |
|---|---|---|
| Median stake held by directors and officers | 0.63% | 0.95% |
| Group stake under 1% | 16 | 13 |
| Group stake of 1% to 5% | 5 | 7 |
| Group stake of 5% or more | 5 | 5 |
| An individual insider holding 3% or more | 5 | 5 |
| Former parent kept a stake of about 10% or more | 3 | 4 |
Source: each company’s first proxy statement, annual report or prospectus after the spin-off, via SEC EDGAR; calculations mine.
The two columns are close to identical. In most spin-offs, insiders owned less than 1% of the company. The stand-out exceptions with large insider ownership were split evenly between the best and the worst performers:
| Spin-off | Group | Directors and officers, share of company | Largest insider holders at the time |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vitesse Energy | Outperformer | 15.8% | Joseph Steinberg (director, chairman of former parent Jefferies) 9.61%; Brian Friedman (director, Jefferies president) 3.99% |
| Biohaven Ltd | Outperformer | 15.5% | John Childs (director) 8.1%; Vlad Coric (CEO) 4.1% |
| IAC | Outperformer | 11.2% | Barry Diller (chairman) and family hold all Class B; Joseph Levin (CEO) about 3.3m shares |
| Pennant Group | Outperformer | 10.4% | Daniel Walker (CEO) 6.7%; Christopher Christensen (director) 2.7% |
| ESAB | Outperformer | 7.0% | Mitchell Rales (director, co-founder of former parent) 6.0% |
| Fox Corp | Underperformer | 17.5% | K. Rupert Murdoch (co-chairman) 38.9% of voting Class B via Murdoch Family Trust |
| Inhibrx Biosciences | Underperformer | 17.1% | Jon Faiz Kayyem (director) 7.51%; Mark Lappe (CEO) 6.88%; Brendan Eckelman (officer) 3.88% |
| Vimeo | Underperformer | 14.6% | Joseph Levin (chairman; CEO of former parent) 11.1%; Barry Diller (director) 6.9% and all Class B |
| GCI Liberty | Underperformer | 7.9% | John Malone (chairman) 53.5% of votes; 9.1% of Series A, 93.9% of Series B, 6.2% of Series C |
| Douglas Elliman | Underperformer | 7.7% | Howard Lorber (CEO; also CEO of former parent) 5.04% |
Source: company proxy statements via SEC EDGAR. For companies with more than one share class, the percentage is of all shares combined.
Among these ten, profitability again did more of the sorting than ownership did. Four of the six that were profitable before the spin were outperformers, and three of the four that were losing money were underperformers.
This test is narrower than Greenblatt’s own. He looks at how management will be paid, including stock and option grants that haven’t vested yet, and I only measured shares already owned. I also looked only at the two ends of the sample and not the 36 companies in the middle. Within those limits, a large insider stake didn’t distinguish the spin-offs that did well from the ones that did badly.
Where Things Stand
Going back through Greenblatt’s argument with the past decade of data:
- Buying every spin-off: didn’t beat the index. The median was level with the market after one year and behind it after two.
- Indiscriminate selling: shows up clearly in trading volume, and not at all in price. There was no dip to buy and no better day to wait for.
- Leverage: didn’t help. Modest debt did best, and heavy debt wasn’t a reliable signal in either direction.
- Insider ownership: looked the same among the best and worst performers.
What did help was more ordinary. Spin-offs that were already profitable did better than ones that weren’t, in the main sample and outside it. A weak first month, especially at a loss-making company, was a fair warning of a weak first year. And the very small spin-offs were the worst place to look.
None of this means the old studies were wrong about their own era. It may be that the rule worked, became well known, and stopped working. Either that, or the past ten years were simply an unkind decade for spin-offs.
Greenblatt is a highly successful investor and I’d accept that his book faithfully represents what he did to make himself (and his lucky investment partners) quite rich. His thought process is entirely logical, but as we see, the empirics have not replicated well.
I still keep track of corporate spin-offs when scouting for ideas, but now wouldn’t assign a priority to a spun-off company because it looks cheap. Apparently, spins just aren’t the bargains that they used to be.
Important Information
Spin-offs in the main sample (87): 2seventy bio, Aimco, Arconic Corp, Arcosa, Biohaven Ltd, Brighthouse Financial, Carrier Global, Cars.com, Cerence, Cognyte Software, Concentrix, Conduent, Consensus Cloud Solutions, CONSOL Energy, Constellation Energy, CorePoint Lodging, Corteva, Crane Company, Curbline Properties, Douglas Elliman, Dow Inc, DT Midstream, Embecta, Enhabit, Equitrans Midstream, ESAB, Everus Construction Group, F&G Annuities & Life, Fortrea, Fox Corp, Frontdoor, FTAI Infrastructure, Garrett Motion, GCI Liberty, GE HealthCare, GE Vernova, GRAIL, GXO Logistics, Hilton Grand Vacations, IAA, IAC, Inhibrx Biosciences, International Seaways, JBG Smith Properties, Knife River, Kontoor Brands, Kyndryl, Lionsgate Studios, Loyalty Ventures, MasterBrand, Maxeon Solar Technologies, Millrose Properties, MSG Entertainment (2020), MSG Entertainment (2023), N-able, NCR Atleos, Net Lease Office Properties, nVent Electric, Organon, Orion Office REIT, Otis Worldwide, Park Hotels & Resorts, Pennant Group, PHINIA, Qnity Electronics, Ralliant, Resideo Technologies, Retail Value Inc, RXO, Sandisk, Solstice Advanced Materials, Solventum, Sylvamo, The Aaron’s Company, Varex Imaging, Veoneer, Veralto, Vestis, Victoria’s Secret, Vimeo, Vitesse Energy, Vontier, WK Kellogg Co, Worthington Steel, Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Xperi Inc, ZimVie.
Limitations: Eighty-seven companies is a small sample, and I’ve cut it many different ways, so one or two apparently clear results are what chance alone could produce; the profitability marker is the only one that also held outside the main sample. The study covers a single decade, and the sector result in particular looks specific to recent years. The list was built from public spin-off calendars and may be missing some transactions. Five plain spin-offs had no usable price data (Bioverativ, Delphi Technologies, Apergy, Spirit MTA REIT, and the twelve-month price for Sunrise Communications); depending on how they did, the twelve-month median could move by roughly -2.5 to +2.0 points. Sixteen delisted companies are measured on price change without dividends, against the index on the same basis. The micro-cap label was assigned by judgment, though first-day market values broadly support it. Pre-spin financials are carve-out accounts, a few are distorted by one-time items, and five market values were unusable for the valuation test. Insider ownership was collected only for the 51 outperformers and underperformers, from filings made a median of seven months after the spin-off, and counts shares owned but not unvested awards; figures were extracted with AI assistance and spot-checked against the filings.
Note: All returns shown are hypothetical and backtested. They describe what a simple rule would have produced on past data, before trading costs and taxes, and do not represent the results of any actual account. Past performance does not predict future results. Spin-offs and other special situations carry risks beyond those of a diversified portfolio: newly separated companies often have short operating histories as independent businesses, limited analyst coverage, heavy early trading, and in some cases substantial debt. The smallest spin-offs can be thinly traded and have lost most of their value. The companies named in this article are illustrations of a research exercise, not recommendations to buy or sell any security. Analysis assisted by Claude Fable 5.2.
Positions and scope: As of last review date, the author, Nick Bormann, holds none of the named companies in his personal accounts but may buy or sell any security discussed at any time without notice. Bormann Wealth Management, LLC is a registered investment adviser and holds no positions in the securities discussed here. This article is general research, not advice for your circumstances. See Disclosures and Form ADV Part 2A.
Warren E. Buffett, letter to the partners of Buffett Partnership, Ltd., May 29, 1969. ↩︎
Joel Greenblatt, You Can Be a Stock Market Genius (Simon & Schuster, 1997), ch. 3. The study he cites is Patrick Cusatis, James Miles and J. Randall Woolridge, “Restructuring Through Spinoffs: The Stock Market Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1993). ↩︎
One caveat on the accounting. Pre-spin financial statements are “carve-out” accounts prepared by the parent. They leave out the interest on debt the new company takes on at separation, and some are distorted by one-time charges. Lease obligations are excluded from my measure for debt. ↩︎
